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Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.: When Does
Exhaustion of Policy Limits Terminate an
Insurer's Duty to Defend?
A liability insurance policy imposes two duties on an insurer with respect to
the insured: the duty to indemnify and the duty to defend.1 In the past, when
an insurer believed liability would exceed policy limits, it argued that the latter
duty is dependent on the former, and that therefore exhaustion of policy limits
terminated the duty to defend. Although there is general consensus today that
the duty to defend is independent of and broader than the duty to indemnify, 2
most courts have held that some forms of exhaustion can extinguish the duty to
defend. 3 Courts following this rule, however, have not agreed on the forms of
exhaustion that suffice.4
In Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,5 the North Carolina
Supreme Court addressed this problem, one of first impression in the state. The
court held that when a policy reads, "'Our duty to settle or defend ends when
our limit of liability for this coverage has been exhausted,' "6 the insurer's duty
to defend continues until exhaustion of coverage occurs either through settle-
ment of a claim against the insured or through a judgment against the insured.7
This Note examines the language changes insurers have made in their poli-
cies in an attempt to terminate the duty to defend on exhaustion of liability
coverage. It discusses the split in opinion between courts that have held exhaus-
tion ends the duty to defend, and those that have held it does not. The Note
then addresses the disagreement among courts in the former group over the
form of exhaustion that suffices to end the duty. It analyzes the Brown court's
reasoning and looks at the policy implications of the decision. The Note con-
cludes that the decision is correct as a matter of policy, but that the court should
have rested its holding on less vulnerable grounds.
In Brown defendant Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (LMCC) sold
plaintiffs Doyle and Coleen Brown a $25,000 automobile insurance policy that
contained the following duty-to-defend provision:
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for
1. There is no North Carolina statutory requirement that an insurer provide its insured with a
defense. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1989). A company, however, may provide this by
contract. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 391, 390 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1990).
2. Eg., Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 691, 340
S.E.2d 374, 377, reh'g denied, 316 N.C. 386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986); see A. WINDT, INSURANCE
CLAIMS AND DIsPUTES 201 n.262 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990) (listing cases holding that the duty to
defend is independent of the duty to pay); Zulkey & Pollard, The Duty to Defend After Exhaustion of
Policy Limits, FOR THE DEF., June 1985, at 21, 21 ("It is a well-recognized legal principle that an
insurer's duty to defend is broader than the insurer's duty to indemnify the insured.").
3. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. For examples of forms of exhaustion that may
extinguish the duty to defend, see infra text accompanying note 94.
4. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
5. 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
6. Id. at 389, 390 S.E.2d at 151 (quoting policy).
7. Id. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154.
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which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an
auto accident. We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate,
any claim or suit asking for these damages. In addition to our limit of
liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or
defend ends when our limit of liability for this coverage has been
exhausted.8
When Joan Hinson brought a tort action against the Browns as a result of a
car accident, LMCC hired a law firm to represent the Browns.9 In response to
Hinson's complaint, the firm filed an answer denying any negligence by the
Browns.10 In an affidavit, however, the law firm gave its opinion that the court
probably would find the Browns liable, and it predicted a verdict between
$50,000 and $75,000.11 Against the Browns' wishes but at the direction of
LMCC, the firm offered Hinson a $25,000 settlement.' 2 When Hinson refused
the offer, LMCC paid her this amount in exchange for a release of its obligation;
Hinson did not release the Browns. 13 LMCC terminated the Browns' defense
and discharged the law firm. 14 The court later entered a $45,000 judgment
against the Browns, crediting to them the $25,000 payment by LMCC.15
The Browns sued LMCC, claiming that it was obligated to defend them
even after paying the policy limit. LMCC argued that by paying Hinson the full
coverage, it discharged its duty to defend the Browns. The trial court entered
summary judgment for LMCC.16
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the duty-to-
defend provision was ambiguous.' 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed in a four-three decision.18 It agreed with the court of appeals that the
duty-to-defend provision was ambiguous because it did not specify what form of
exhaustion terminated the duty to defend. 19 Proof of ambiguity lay in the par-
ties' conflicting interpretations: the Browns argued that only a settlement or
judgment could exhaust the policy limits, but LMCC maintained that any man-
8. Id. at 389, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
9. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
10. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 466, 369 S.E.2d 367, 368
(1988), aff'd in part, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
11. Brown, 326 N.C. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
12. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151-52.
13. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 152. LMCC paid Hinson pursuant to North Carolina General
Statutes § 1-540.3, which allows advance payments to an injured person by a party or the party's
insurer. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.3(a) (1983)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 391, 390 S.E.2d at 152.
17. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 477, 369 S.E.2d 367, 374
(1988), aff'd in part, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990). The supreme court did not review the
decision of the court of appeals that an insured cannot hold her insurer vicariously liable for the
negligence of an attorney it has hired, because the attorney is an independent contractor. For an
analysis of this decision of the court of appeals, see Note, Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co- The Rock, the Hard Place, and the Insurance Defense Attorney, 67 N.C.L. REv. 1424 (1989).
18. Brown, 326 N.C. at 397, 390 S.E.2d at 156. Chief Justice Exum wrote the majority opinion,
which was joined by Justices Frye, Martin, and Mitchell. Justice Whichard wrote the dissent, which
was joined by Justices Meyer and Webb.
19. Id. at 393-94, 390 S.E.2d at 153-54.
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ner of payment would suffice.20 The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals
decision to interpret the provision against LMCC, and concluded that LMCC's
duty to defend the Browns did not end until there was a settlement or judg-
ment.2 1 In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Exum relied in part on
supporting opinions from courts in three states and one federal district that have
interpreted identical language. 22
Justice Whichard dissented, arguing that there was no ambiguity. 23 Ac-
cording to the dissent's examination of language changes in duty-to-defend pro-
visions over the past twenty-five years, the majority's interpretation amended the
disputed provision by including words that LMCC patently omitted. 24 Justice
Whichard also claimed that the majority's interpretation of the provision
"render[ed] it [the provision] meaningless surplusage," because the duty to de-
fend, if it does not end earlier, always terminates on settlement or judgment. 25
The dissent went on to distinguish the cases the majority claimed to follow, 26
and then argued that the majority's interpretation ran counter to the public pol-
icy of the state because it discouraged payments to claimants before judgment or
full settlement. 27
Because Brown decided an issue of first impression in North Carolina, it is
helpful to examine other courts' analyses of the problem. It is important, how-
ever, to distinguish cases interpreting different policy language, for the insurance
industry has changed the wording of the standard liability policy several times.
Before 1955 the defense coverage clause was separate from the liability coverage
clause, and the policy limited the insurer's duty to defend only by prefacing the
defense provision. The preface stated that the insurer would defend only suits
"'[a]s respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy under
coverages A [bodily injury liability] and B [property damage liability].' "28 In
1955 the insurance industry changed the preliminary language slightly, to read:
"'With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury
liability and for property damage liability.' "29 The defense coverage clause and
the liability coverage clause remained separate. 30 In 1956 the drafters merged
the defense coverage clause into the liability coverage clause and changed the
20. Id. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154.
21. Id. Courts resolve contractual ambiguity against the drafter, in this case the insurer.
Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 506, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978).
22. Brown, 326 N.C. at 394-96, 390 S.E.2d at 154-55 (citing Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp. 536,
537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79, 83 (Ala. 1985); Anderson v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, 521, 339 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1986); Pareti v.
Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417, 420-21 (La. 1988)).
23. Id. at 397-98, 390 S.E.2d at 156 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 400, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 400-01, 390 S.E.2d at 158 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 402-03, 390 S.E.2d at 158-59 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
28. Van Vugt, Termination of the Insurer's Duty to Defend by Exhaustion of Policy Limits, 44
INS. CouNs. J. 254, 256 (1977) (quoting N. RiSJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE CASES, STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 2 (1964)).
29. Id. (quoting N. RISJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STAN-




language limiting the duty to defend. The revised policy provided that the in-
surer would defend only suits "'seeking damages which are payable under the
terms of this policy.' "31 In 1966 the drafters again changed the language limit-
ing the duty to defend: "'[T]he company shall not be obligated to pay any claim
or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's
liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.' "32 The
insurance industry effected these changes to make clear that the insurer's duty to
defend extends only as far as its duty to indemnify, and that therefore an insurer
terminates its duty to defend by paying the policy limits in any manner. 33 None-
theless, courts have been far from unanimous in rendering such an
interpretation.
The decisions construing the pre-1955 policy language are split. Some cases
focus on the restrictiveness of the preliminary language and hold that the duty to
defend is dependent on the duty to indemnify; therefore, payment of the policy
limit terminates the duty to defend.34 At least one court also based its opinion
on the anomaly of requiring an insurer with no financial interest in the outcome
of the case to defend an insured. 35 Cases holding that the duty to defend is
independent of the duty to pay, and that therefore exhaustion of coverage limits
does not terminate the duty to defend, focus on the policy language providing
that "the company shall defend any suit" and the separateness of the defense
coverage clause and the liability coverage clause.36
There is also a split in opinions interpreting the 1955 policy language.
Cases holding that exhaustion of policy limits ends the duty to defend focus on
the changed language, construing "such insurance as is afforded by this policy"
to refer to the amount of liability coverage afforded. 37 They also point out that
the limiting phrase immediately precedes the defense agreement. 38 Courts that
have interpreted the 1955 policy against the insurer have held that the duty to
31. Id. at 257 (quoting N. RISJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES,
STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 34 (1964)).
32. Id. (quoting N. RSJARD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STAN-
DARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDix 265 app. (1964)).
33. Id. at 256.
34. Eg., General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1964) (applying Illinois
law); Denham v. La Salle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576, 584 (7th Cir.) (same), cerL denied, 335
U.S. 871 (1948); see supra text accompanying note 28.
35. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 323, 8 A.2d 750, 752 (1939).
36. E-g., American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 1951) (applying South
Carolina law); Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1949) (applying Texas
law); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 187-88, 433 P.2d 795, 798
(1967); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 1073-74,
131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), appeal withdrawn, 1 A.D.2d 1008, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835
(N.Y. App. Div. 1956); see supra text accompanying note 28.
37. Eg., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Trucking Co., 328 F. Supp. 415, 416-17 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D. Ind. 1964); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 9, 131 S.E.2d 534, 535-36 (1963); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44
Ill. App. 2d 235, 255-56, 194 N.E.2d 489, 500 (1963); Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rolph, 109 N.H. 142,
144, 244 A.2d 186, 188 (1968); see supra text accompanying note 29.
38. E-g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co., 597 F. Supp. 946, 950-51 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 631 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1985) (issues rendered moot by settlement pending appeal).
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defend is independent of and broader than the duty to indemnify.3 9 At least one
case holds that the duty to defend continues after judgment or settlement;40 the
court supported its opinion by declaring the policy language ambiguous and by
turning to the state's public policy of protecting insureds. 4 1
Only one case interprets the 1956 policy. In Simmons v. Jeffords42 the
court construed the language as obligating the insurer to defend the insured until
final settlement or judgment.43 The court rejected the insurer's attempt to
tender the policy limits into court before settlement or judgment.44
The only court interpreting the post-1966 policy reached the same conclu-
sion. In Conway v. Country Casualty Insurance Co.,4 5 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the duty to defend does not end when the insurer pays the policy
limits to the claimant and that the payment does not result in a release of the
insured.46 The court underscored the unambiguous language of the policy,
which referred to "judgments or settlements;" since neither had occurred, the
insurer could not claim relief of its duty to defend.47 In a case decided five years
later by the same court, the court relieved the insurer of its duty to defend when
it paid the policy limits through judgments and settlements.48
The language variations described above are different forms of the standard
liability policy. Other cases have interpreted policies that, like the Brown policy,
do not fall into one of these categories. The policy in Gross v. Lloyds of London
Insurance Co.49 provided that exhaustion would occur by payment of judgments
or settlements "or after such limit of the Company's liability has been tendered
for settlements."' 50 The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the added lan-
guage as contemplating payment before judgment or settlement; the insurer
therefore could terminate its duty to defend by tendering the insured's policy
limits into court.5 1 In National Union Insurance Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 5 2
the court released the insurer from its duty to defend after it deposited the
39. Eg., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 56 Cal. App.
3d 791, 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 55 (1976) (primary insurer's duty to defend continued, but court
ordered excess carriers to reimburse primary insurer for costs beyond the policy limits); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. East, 240 So. 2d 277, 279 (Miss. 1970) ("The defense clause... is... a contractual
right of the insured, for which he is paid a premium.... ."); Prince v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 143 N.W.2d 708, 717 (N.D. 1966) ("The defendant... had a duty to defend all actions against
the plaintiff regardless of the amount involved.").
40. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 431 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
41. Id. at 429, 431.
42. 260 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
43. Id. at 642.
44. Id. at 641; see supra text accompanying note 31.
45. 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442 N.E.2d 245 (1982).
46. Id. at 395, 442 N.E.2d at 247.
47. Id. at 396, 442 N.E.2d at 248; see supra text accompanying note 32.
48. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 56, 514 N.E.2d 150, 165 (1987).
49. 121 Wis. 2d 78, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984).
50. Id. at 83, 358 N.W.2d at 269.
51. Id. at 89, 358 N.W.2d at 272. The insurer could not terminate its duty to defend on this
occasion, however, because it had not highlighted the added wording in the policy or otherwise given
clear notice to the insured of the substantial change in the language. Id. at 88, 358 N.W.2d at 271.
52. 301 A.2d 222 (D.C. 1973).
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amount of the policy limit with the court because the policy stated that the duty
ended when the insurer "paid or tendered or deposited in court such part of such
judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's liability."'5 3 The Dela-
ney v. Vardine Paratransit, Inc.54 court held that use of the language "[o]ur
payment of liability insurance limit ends our duty to defend or settle" did not
release the insurer of its duty to defend when it paid the policy limits directly to
the claimant who had sued the insured. 55 In Batdorf v. Transamerica Title In-
surance Co.,56 the court released the insurer from its duty to defend after it paid
its insureds the policy limits. The Batdorf policy contained perhaps the most
explicit language interpreted by a court so far:
The Company shall have the right to... defend the insured...
reserving however, the option at any time of settling the claim or pay-
ing the amount of this policy in full.
The Company may at any time pay this policy in full, whereupon
all liability of the Company shall terminate .... The liability of the
Company shall in no case exceed the actual loss of the insured and
costs which the Company is obligated to pay.57
All courts interpreting the Brown wording, which is the post-1966 language
without the last six words, "by payments of judgments or settlements," have
reached the conclusion the Brown court did: only exhaustion of policy limits by
way of judgment or settlement extinguishes the insurer's duty to defend. The
Stanley v. Cobb s5 court read the "[w]e will settle or defend" language as provid-
ing the only two options for exhaustion. 59 The courts in Stanley, Samply v.
Integrity Insurance Co.6t and Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.61 rejected the claim that an insurer's duty to defend ends when it pays the
policy limits into court. The court in Pareti v. Sentry Indemnity Co.62 released
the insurer from its duty to defend because a good-faith settlement had ex-
hausted the policy limits. 63
This overview of cases shows that the issue in Brown concerns not one but
two questions. First, does exhaustion of liability limits terminate the duty to
defend? If not, the insurer is obligated to defend the insured until the very
end-that is, until resolution of all claimants' actions and conclusion of all ap-
peals. Very few courts have reached this conclusion; those that have were inter-
53. Id. at 224-25. Another court reached the same conclusion when an insurer using almost
identical policy language tendered its policy limits into court in an interpleader action. See Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
54. 132 Misc. 2d 397, 504 N.Y.S.2d 70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
55. Id. at 398, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
56. 41 Wash. App. 254, 702 P.2d 1211 (1985).
57. Id. at 256-57, 702 P.2d at 1212-13.
58. 624 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
59. Id. at 537.
60. 476 So. 2d 79, 83-84 (Ala. 1985).
61. 177 Ga. App. 520, 522, 339 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1986).
62. 536 So. 2d 417 (La. 1988).
63. Id. at 424.
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preting pre-1966 policy language.64 Second, if exhaustion does terminate the
duty to defend, what form of exhaustion suffices? The Brown court, following
the majority trend, held that only exhaustion through settlement or judgment
suffices. 65 Other courts have approved exhaustion by way of the insurer's
tendering the policy limits into court or to the insured.66 Notably, no court has
held that LMCC's method of exhaustion, tendering the coverage limits to the
claimant, terminates the duty to defend.67
Against this backdrop it is easier to understand the ambiguity dispute in
Brown. The majority and dissent agreed on the answer to the first question: the
Brown policy language explicitly declares that exhaustion of liability limits ter-
minates the duty to defend. All the justices conceded that the insurer is not
obligated to pay for an appeal.68 They disagreed, however, on the second ques-
64. Eg., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 430-31
(E.D. Pa. 1981); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 791, 804, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 55 (1976); Travelers Indem. Co. v. East, 240 So. 2d 277, 280
(Miss. 1970); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 1073,
131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), appeal withdrawn, 1 A.D.2d 1008, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835
(N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
65. Although LMCC did not make the argument, an insurer might label payment to a plaintiff
in partial satisfaction of his claim against the insured a "partial settlement" and contend that it has
met the Brown requirement that exhaustion occur through judgment or settlement. A commentator
from the insurance industry rejects this proposition:
The better reasoning would seem to support the view that an agreement whereby the
insurer tenders its policy limits to a single claimant in exchange for a partial release of his
claim against the insured is not in fact a "settlement" but merely establishes a credit
against the insured's ultimate liability, and therefore a payment of policy limits pursuant to
such an agreement would not terminate the duty to defend.
Van Vugt, supra note 28, at 264 (the author bases his position on a reading of the post-1966
standard liability policy, not the Brown policy).
66. E.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D. Ind. 1964) (in-
surer's duty to defend ended when it tendered policy limits unconditionally into court in an inter-
pleader action); National Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222, 225 (D.C. 1973)
(duty to defend ended when insurer paid amount of policy limits into court); Batdorf v. Transamer-
ica Title Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 254, 258, 702 P.2d 1211, 1213 (1985) (court relieved insurer of
duty to defend when it paid insureds the amount of liability coverage).
67. At least two courts have rejected this form of exhaustion. In Conway v. Country Casualty
Insurance Co., the insurer paid the claimant with the insured's consent, but she released neither the
insurer nor the insured. 92 Ill. 2d 388, 395, 442 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1982). In rejecting the insurer's
claim that payment of the policy limit terminated its duty to defend the insured, the Illinois Supreme
Court relied on state law holding that the duty to defend is not dependent on the duty to indemnify,
but instead arises from the insurance contract. Id. at 394, 442 N.E.2d at 247. Because the policy
expressly provided that the insurer could terminate its duty to defend by paying the policy limits in
"any judgments or settlements," and there was neither a judgment nor a settlement, the court held
that the insurer did not terminate its duty to defend. Id. at 396, 442 N.E.2d at 248; see supra notes
45-47 and accompanying text.
In Delaney v. Vardine Paratransit, Inc-, the insurer "unilaterally, paid its policy limit of $5,000
to plaintiffs without regard to settlement of the litigation or any further exposure of its insured." 132
Misc. 2d 397, 398, 504 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). The New York Supreme Court,
holding that the insurer had not terminated its duty to defend, relied on a state regulation that
mandates certain provisions for automobile liability insurance policies. The regulation states: "The
amounts so incurred under this subdivision, except settlement of claims and suits, shall be payable by
the company in addition to the applicable policy limits." N.Y. COMP. CODas R. & REuS. tit. 11,
§ 60.1(b) (1985). The court held that the regulation "clearly anticipates that the insurer may not
unilaterally avoid payment of defense costs and related expenses by the ex parte payment of the
limits of its policy." Delaney, 132 Misc. 2d at 398, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 71; see supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
68. Because the issue was not before the court, it is not clear how many justices would find that
1666 [Vol. 69
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tion. The majority found the Brown language ambiguous because it is unclear
what form of exhaustion terminates the duty to defend.69 The dissent claimed
that there is no ambiguity: "[T]he only reasonable interpretation is that by pay-
ing its full policy limits to the party injured by its insured, defendant 'exhausted'
its limit of liability and ended its duty to settle or defend."'70
The North Carolina Supreme Court is the first court to base its interpreta-
tion of the Brown policy language on a finding of ambiguity. Four other courts
interpreting the same language have reached holdings consistent with Brown,
but none found ambiguity. The Stanley7 1 and Anderson 72 courts held that the
language is not ambiguous: it clearly requires exhaustion through settlement or
judgment. The Samply court did not mention the ambiguity issue.73 The Pareti
court held that an insurer may terminate its defense obligations under the ex-
press terms of the policy by entering into a good-faith settlement for the policy
limits. 74 The Pareti court found no ambiguity because there was a settlement,
but had there been a tender of policy limits the same language arguably would
have been ambiguous. 75
The vulnerability of the ambiguity argument is indicated to some extent by
the justices' votes: although there was only one dissenter among all the judges
deciding Samply, Stanley, Pareti, and Anderson, Brown is a four-three decision.
Ambiguity is a vulnerable basis because it is largely a question of fact, not of
law. For example, the majority cited several cases holding that a difference in
the parties' interpretations is a factor going toward a finding of ambiguity,
although such a conflict is not dispositive.76 "A difference of judicial opinion
regarding proper construction of policy language" is also some evidence that the
provision is ambiguous. 77 Arguably the potential for judges changing their
minds is higher with such a fact-based inquiry than it is with a more law-based
analysis.
the duty to defend ends when there is a judgment or settlement with only one of several claimants.
Nor is it possible to know how many justices would find that the insurer has a continuing duty to
defend the insured in a codefendant's suit for contribution or indemnification. At least one commen-
tator declares it "well settled" that the duty to defend does not continue in these two situations. Van
Vugt, supra note 28, at 263.
69. Brown, 326 N.C. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154.
70. Id. at 398, 390 S.E.2d at 156 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
71. Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp. 536, 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
72. Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, 521, 339 S.E.2d 660,
661 (1986).
73. Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79, 81-83 (Ala. 1985).
74. Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417,423 (La. 1988). The court went on to state that
the insurer must "make every effort to avoid prejudicing the insured by the timing of its withdrawal
from litigation," and "make allowances for the time that the insured will need to retain new counsel,
and should continue to represent the insured after the settlement, if necessary, until new counsel can
be retained." Id.
75. Id. at 421 n.3.
76. Brown, 326 N.C. at 392, 390 S.E.2d at 153 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Freeman-White Assoc., 322 N.C. 77, 83, 366 S.E.2d 480, 484 (1988); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins.
Co., 311 N.C. 621, 630, 319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (1984); Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354,
172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970)).
77. Id. (citing Maddox v. Insurance Co., 303 N.C. 648, 654, 280 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1981); Elec-
tric Co. v. Insurance Co., 229 N.C. 518, 521, 50 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1948); Annotation, Insurance-
Ambiguity-Split Court Opinions, 4 A.L.R.4TH 1253, 1255 (1981)).
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The decision would have had the same effect, yet stood on firmer ground,
had the court based it on the reasonable interpretation that "[o]ur duty to settle
or defend" unambiguously defines the only two methods of exhaustion.78 This
also would have given the North Carolina insurance industry clearer guidelines
for changing the policy language. Such a holding would have told insurers that
they need to erase "to settle or defend" from their policies. As the decision
stands, it tells insurers only that the Brown policy language is ambiguous; it does
not tell them how to remove the ambiguity to attain the effects they seek.
Although the dissent criticized the majority's claim of ambiguity, its attack
is weak in that it relies on Pareti, Stanley, and Anderson, cases whose holdings
are consistent with Brown. The dissent flip-flopped by turning to these cases to
support the argument that the policy language is unambiguous, 79 and then dis-
tinguishing their holdings by claiming a significant factual difference.80
The dissenters argued that an insurer necessarily exhausts policy limits by
tendering the amount to a claimant, as in Brown, because it will not get the
money back.81 In contrast, by tendering the amount into court, as in Anderson,
Samply, and Stanley, the insurer will recover the sum if it makes the tender
conditional on the insured being found liable and the insured is then found not
liable.8 2 The weakness of this argument is that it considers only the claimant
and ignores the insured, to whom, after all, the defense is of value. Professor
Appleman asserts:
[T]he insurer's duty is both to defend actions and to pay judgment
against the insured. Otherwise, where the damages exceed the policy
coverage, the insurer could walk into court, toss the amount of the
policy on the table, and blithely inform the insured that the rest was up
to him. This would obviously constitute a breach of the insurer's con-
tract to defend actions against the insured, for which premiums had
been paid, and should not be tolerated by the courts.8 3
Although it was an insurer's attempt to tender policy limits into court that
prompted the Simmons court to declare that "a most significant protection af-
forded by the policy-that of defense-is rendered a near nullity,"'84 the same
concern applies when the insurer pays the amount directly to the claimant.
To distinguish further the tendering of policy limits into court and to the
claimant, the dissent argued that Brown runs counter to the North Carolina
78. This was the basis for the decisions in Stanley and Anderson. Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp.
536, 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, 521,
339 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1986). Nonetheless, the majority's finding of ambiguity is defensible. For a
recitation of the court's chief argument that the method of exhaustion is ambiguous, see infra text
accompanying note 94 (listing various methods LMCC may have intended).
79. Brown, 326 N.C. at 397-98, 390 S.E.2d at 156 (whichard, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 400-01, 390 S.E.2d at 158 (Whichard, J., dissenting). Opinions from other courts
seem to indicate that the factual distinction does not support the dissent's argument, but cuts against
it. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
81. Brown, 326 N.C. at 401, 390 S.E.2d at 158 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Whichard, J., dissenting).
83. 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRAcriCE § 4685, at 21-22 (1942).
84. Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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public policy that encourages insurers to make advance partial payments to
claimants before final settlements.85 Although Brown does not further en-
courage partial payments to claimants, neither does it discourage such pay-
ments, as the dissent contends. Section 1-540.3(a) still encourages insurers to
make partial payments by declaring that the payments do not constitute an ad-
mission of liability by either the insured or the insurer;86 Brown's only effect is
that the payments will not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend the insured.
Moreover, the dissent's policy argument ignores the state's countervailing public
policy, which is to give effect to all parts of a contract, 7 including the " 'signifi-
cant protection... of defense.' s88
Another argument of the dissent is that the majority's interpretation
amends the disputed provision to include words that LMCC patently omitted.8 9
The Brown policy lacks language that the post-1966 policy contained: "ITihe
company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any
suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements." 90 Because "[t]he language specifying
means of exhaustion of policy limits is patently absent in the contract at issue
here," Justice Whichard argued that the court should have given effect to the
drafters' clear intent to leave limitless the forms of exhaustion that end the in-
surer's duty to defend.9 1 Although the argument is attractive in theory, it does
not defeat the majority's finding of ambiguity. That is, whether or not the omis-
sion of "by payments of judgments or settlements" is purposeful, the court must
resolve the ambiguous result against the drafter.
Even without a finding of ambiguity, the dissent's argument is unpersuasive
because the language leaves the insured unwarned. 92 It is unlikely that there are
many insureds who, on reading the Brown proviso, contemplate the multiple
avenues of escape open to the insurer:9 3 paying the policy limits into court and
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.3(a) (1983) (allowing for partial payments before settlement).
86. Id.
87. Brown, 326 N.C. at 393, 390 S.E.2d at 153 (citing Bolton Corp. v. T.A. Loving Co., 317
N.C. 623, 628, 347 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1986)).
88. Id. at 396-97, 390 S.E.2d at 155 (quoting Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641, 642 (E.D.
Pa. 1966)).
89. Id. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
90. Van Vugt, supra note 28, at 257 (emphasis added) (quoting N. RISJARD & J. AUSTIN,
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 265 app.
(1964)).
91. Brown, 326 N.C. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting). The dissent also
argued that the majority's interpretation of the disputed language renders it "meaningless surplus-
age," because the duty to defend, if it does not end earlier, always terminates on settlement or
judgment. Id. at 400, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting). The argument fails, however, for
the provision tells the insured that the insurer will not pay to appeal the case once there is a judg-
ment. Although the Brown court did not decide the issue, the provision may also inform the insured
that the duty to defend stops on judgment or settlement in other situations in which the insured
continues to need a defense. See supra note 68.
92. See Kosce v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 159 N.J. Super. 340, 345-46, 387 A.2d 1259, 1262
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) ("When construing language covering an obligation such as the duty to
defend the insured, the court must look to the reasonable expectations of the insured.").
93. See id. at 346, 387 A.2d at 1262 ("We are dealing with language in a long, detailed insur-
ance policy which an insured would find difficult to understand even after painstaking study.").
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interpleading conflicting claimants, paying the limits to one of several claimants
in exchange for a settlement of that one claim against the insured, paying the
limits in full or partial satisfaction of a judgment against the insured, advancing
the amount to the insured without investigating available defenses, or paying the
limits to the claimant in return for a release of the insurer but not the insured.94
When courts have approved termination of the duty to defend on unilateral
tender of policy limits, they have had before them much more explicit policy
language. Unlike the Brown policy, the policies in Gross,95 National Union,96
Batdorf,97 and Commercial Union 98 did not leave the term "exhausted" unde-
fined. Although by specifying the means of exhaustion an insurer may be faced
with a form of exhaustion it did not contemplate, this route is the only fair one
for insureds. To leave the forms of exhaustion limitless is to take advantage of
the insured, who is not alerted to the issue without some affirmative language in
the contract defining "exhaustion." Moreover, the insurer is the party in the
best position to raise and clarify the issue.
Even assuming that an insured reading the policy language used in Brown
understands that the insurer readily can escape the duty to defend, such a con-
tract may be void as against public policy. Even those in the insurance industry
concede that "an insurer cannot unilaterally pay money and walk away." 99 One
industry article states:
[E]ven in jurisdictions that have.., held that an insurer can terminate
its defense obligation by paying the maximum amount of coverage
specified by the policy, it has been widely accepted that the insurer
cannot avoid its obligation to defend against an insured's contingent
liability by early payment of the policy limits without effectuating a
settlement or without obtaining the permission of the insured. 100
Professor Long agrees. He writes that the duty to defend should not end on
exhaustion of the policy limit when the result would prejudice the insured.'01
He argues that an insurer should not be allowed to pay the policy limit to its
insured and thereby leave the insured to fend for himself, because this is an
unjustified attempt by the insurer to free itself from its contractual duty to
defend. 102
The duty-to-defend provision is a way to prevent an insurer from aban-
doning its insured by paying its policy limits into court or to the claimant, leav-
94. Brown, 326 N.C. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154. Of course, these options are not available to the
insurer if a court declares them against public policy or if the insurer discharges them in bad faith.
95. Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 83, 358 N.W.2d 266, 269 (1984).
96. National Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222, 224-25 (D.C. 1973).
97. Batdorfv. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 254, 256-57, 702 P.2d 1211, 1212-13
(1985).
98. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 865 (S.D. Ind. 1964); see supra
note 53.
99. Zulkey, When Can and How Does an Insurer Properly Exhaust Its Limits?, 56 DEF. COUNS.
J. 202, 205 (1989).
100. Zulkey & Pollard, supra note 2, at 23.
101. R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5-25, at 5-179 (1990).
102. Id. § 5.26, at 5-184.
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ing the insured with litigation and possible appeals.'10 3 If an insurer can do this
by specifically declaring in the policy its right to this option, the insurer is
merely putting the insured on notice that he is obtaining a valueless contractual
right. 1 4
If an insurer wishes to escape its duty to defend when it believes liability
will exceed the policy limit, it should make the contract language unequivocal.
The following suggestion puts the insured on notice by spelling out the forms of
exhaustion without limiting them:
Our duty to settle or defend ends when our liability for this cover-
age has been exhausted. Coverage may be exhausted in any manner,
including but not limited to the following methods of payment by the
Company: to the insured if she consents; to a claimant or claimants in
full or partial satisfaction of a settlement of the claimant's or claim-
ants' actions against the insured; to a claimant or claimants in full or
partial satisfaction of a judgment against the insured; to a claimant or
claimants in return for a release of the Company, whether or not the
insured is also released; to the court when there are conflicting claim-
ants and the Company wishes to interplead.
Unlike the Brown policy, this language is not ambiguous. Moreover, it noti-
fies the insured that the duty to defend can terminate quickly. Although this
Note argues that such a provision is void as against public policy, only the
courts can make such a decision.10 5 Certainly an insurer can defend its contract
more forcefully when it has used explicit language and can argue that it has
acted in good faith 10 6 by making every effort to avoid prejudicing the rights of
its insured. Because the LMCC'policy language was not explicit, leaving the
Browns without warning that LMCC's duty to defend them could end so
quickly, the Brown court correctly decided to construe the ambiguous language
against the defendant. The only mistake the court made was resting its opinion
on so vulnerable a basis as ambiguity.
CHRISTINE J. WICHERS
103. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 83, § 4682, at 36 (1979).
104. It was not the intent of the drafters of the 1966 and earlier policies to give the insured a
valueless right. According to several representatives of the insurance industry, the purpose of the
1966 addition of"by payments ofjudgments or settlements" was merely to clarify the defense cover-
age clause, not to change its substance. Van Vugt, supra note 28, at 263. Therefore, "it could be
persuasively argued that under all forms of the standard liability policy exhaustion of policy limits
can occur only by payment of judgments or settlements." Id. If this is indeed the intent of the
drafters, then they always have meant for the insured to obtain something of value. Of course, the
argument on the other side is what the dissent in Brown asserted: that the drafters of the Brown
policy, which omits the language added in 1966, did not intend to limit exhaustion to settlement or
judgment. Brown, 326 N.C. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
105. Moreover, there is significant support for the position that when the contract makes the
option clear, payment of coverage limits into court is not against public policy. Several courts have
upheld this form of exhaustion. Eg., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 866
(S.D. Ind. 1964); National Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222,225 (D.C. 1973);
Batdorf v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 254, 702 P.2d 1211, 1213 (1985).
106. For an argument that insurers can exhaust policy limits in all cases with multiple claimants
by interpleading, so long as they do so in good faith, see Zulkey, supra note 99, at 204-05.
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